13 Things The West Should Do About Ukraine
Ahead of today's emergency EU summit, Chatham House convened an expert roundtable to examine the policy options available to the West in Ukraine and offered suggestions on short-term and medium-term responses. Here are their recommendations.
1. In the short term, EU members and the US need to communicate an explicit commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty.
It is vital to emphasize that Ukraine’s future must be decided by Ukrainians, not by the West and not by Russia. Ukraine’s territorial integrity is non-negotiable while under threat and occupation.
2. Also, the West’s demand must be a return of Russian forces to their bases in Crimea and withdrawal of the massive influx of other Russian forces.
It is essential, however, that the West formulates these demands very carefully:
(a) in order to avoid the mistakes of 2008 when Russia’s interpretation of the Georgia ceasefire agreement negated its aims; and
(b) in order to prevent Russian exploitation of any vaguely formulated limitations on the future freedom of movement of its forces.
3. Cancelling participation in the G8 summit, halting Russia’s OECD membership application, and suspending trade negotiations, as the US has done, are all appropriate short-term steps.
However, they are measures that will have a limited impact on Russia’s calculus.
4. The most effective near-term pressure that can be exerted on Russia will be financial and economic.
Freezing the assets of and denying visas to elite Russians suspected of money laundering or involved in the actions against Ukraine are likely to be measures that will influence Russian thinking and, possibly, the government’s behaviour. Should the situation deteriorate in the near term, Western action will be more important
than Western unity. On each of these economic steps, the US and UK can and should take the lead - even if others do not immediately follow.
5. Ramp up the counter-narrative to the Russian propaganda operation.
Statements about Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Russia and violence in eastern Ukraine can easily be exposed as lies. This should be done publicly, forcefully and immediately.
6. Senior political figures from the EU should travel to Moscow, as well as to Kyiv, preferably together, to deliver these messages.
7. The EU needs to lay out a clear timetable and set of milestones for the release of its financial assistance package.
In the short term, however, some funds are critically needed for budgetary and political stabilization, and conditionality will be less important for these funds than their impact on Ukraine’s immediate budgetary and political stabilization.
8. Consider President Putin when deciding next steps.
The projection and protection of Russian interests in Ukraine is personal to him. Challenging Putin personally is not advisable, nor is action that will confirm the Russian narrative that the West is an enemy. In this context, keeping forceful NATO responses in reserve in the near term makes most sense.
9. By contrast, it is important to elevate the role of the OSCE in Ukraine.
In particular in its eastern regions, to document any reports of human rights violations, and in advance of any possible referenda or elections.
9. The EU must not go back on its commitment to the Association Agreement with Ukraine.
Conclusion of the agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the newly elected government is essential for Ukraine’s future political as well as economic health.
10. Energy is one of Putin’s main vulnerabilities.
The EU should convey the message privately to Russian energy companies that ‘business as usual’ is not an option while intervention in Ukraine continues.
11. NATO should take a back-seat role so as not to inflame the situation.
However, there can be no question of taking the prospect of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine off the table. NATO members should not only develop contingency plans but also ensure capabilities are available, lest the relationship with Russia deteriorate further in the future.
12. Leave the door open for deeper engagement with Russia.
Especially looking to its next generation of political leaders. If Russia’s approach changes. Russia has the potential to play a constructive role in regional and international security. The West should not play into the Putin administration’s zero-sum approach to international security.
13. The West should shore up partnerships with governments in the countries around Russia’s periphery.
Given the steps taken by Russia towards Ukraine, the United States and EU members should deepen their cooperation and diplomacy with other countries of the former Soviet Union and NATO should enhance its Partnership for Peace activities with them.
You can read the full set of recommendations here.